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ARGUMENT
In an apparent effort to avoid having to address the merits of the trial court's
incorrect decision regarding prejudgment interest, Appellee Iron Head Construction, Inc.
("Iron Head") makes two procedural arguments. First, Iron Head argues that the
judgment appealed from, which was prepared by Iron Head, was not a final order.
Second, Iron Head argues that Appellants Alan K Gumey and Vicki W. Gurney
(collectively, "Gurneys") failed to fulfill their marshaling burden.
Neither of these arguments has merit. The appeal was timely because it was from
a final judgment resolving all of the claims between all of the parties on their merits.1
The Gurneys have no marshaling burden because the decision to award prejudgment
interest is a question of law, which Iron Head admits.
Iron Head's arguments regarding the prejudgment-interest issue actually appealed
are similarly misguided. Iron Head (1) mis-cites applicable law; (2) fails to acknowledge
that an award of prejudgment interest requires a determination of liability and an award
of damages, whereas Iron Head compromised the case in the middle of trial, prior to any
finding of liability and without recovering any damages; and (3) ignores that prejudgment
interest may not be awarded on equitable claims such as unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit.

The ongoing proceedings in the trial court, mentioned by Iron Head, are in the
nature of collection efforts of a judgment that was never stayed.
1

I.

THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM WAS A FINAL ORDER BECAUSE
IT RESOLVED ALL OF THE CLAIMS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Iron Head first argues that the Gumeys' appeal on the issue of prejudgment

interest is from a nonfinal order because the issue of the validity of Iron Head's
mechanic's lien remains unresolved. Appeals can only be taken from "final orders and
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." Utah R. App. P. 3(a). "An order is
final only if it disposes of 'all the claims of all the parties."' Matter of Adoption of Baby
K., 967 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
In the present case, the August 11, 2006 Judgment ("Judgment") appealed from,
which was prepared by Iron Head, was a final order. (A copy of the Judgment is attached
in Addendum A to this Reply Brief.) On April 14, 2004 the trial court entered an Order
expressly recognizing that "the parties agreed on terms to compromise all of Iron
Head's claims, with the exception of its claim for prejudgment interest... [and] Iron
Head's claims, having been thus resolved, are hereby dismissed with prejudice with the
exception of the prejudgment interest claim." (R. 392.) (emphasis added). (A copy of the
April 14, 2004 Order is attached as Addendum B to this Reply Brief.) This necessarily
included Iron Head's claim to foreclose on its mechanic's lien—the fourth cause of
action in its complaint. (R. 2-3.) Regarding the finality of the prejudgment interest
claim, the trial court stated:
2

The April 14, 2004 Order was signed on April 13, 2004 but not entered until
April 14, 2004. In the Gumeys' initial brief on appeal, this Order was referred to as the
"April 13, 2004 Order," and the Gumeys attached it as Addendum B to that initial brief.
Upon further review, however, the Gumeys believe that the "April 14, 2004" designation
is more accurate, and so use this throughout the reply brief. Both the April 13, 2004 and
April 14, 2004 designations reference the same Order.
2

The prejudgment interest payment, in accordance with the
Court's ruling and the schedule agreed to by the parties, will
be due on or before April 14, 2004. Should the Gurneys
make a timely payment of the prejudgment interest amount,
the Gumeys may submit a form of final Judgment pursuant to
which all claims between Iron Head and the Gurneys will be
completely released and discharged. In the event the
Gurneys do not pay the prejudgment interest amount on
or before April 14, 2004, Iron Head may submit a form of
final judgment ordering payment in the amount of
$12,835.48 on the basis of the Court's December 15, [sic]
2003 Order. Iron Head may also, by motion and affidavit(s),
present the issue of the validity of Iron Head's claimed lien to
the Court for a determination as to whether the lien is security
for that obligation.
(R.391-92.) (emphasis added).
In other words, as of April 14, 2004, all that remained to be resolved was
determining if the Gurneys were going to pay the prejudgment interest award when due
and the consequent entry of a final judgment by one of the parties. Iron Head's
mechanic's lien claim was resolved, except to the extent Iron Head elected to present the
issue "by motion and affidavit(s)" of whether the claimed lien could be security for the
prejudgment-interest obligation. (R. 392.) However, Iron Head filed no such motion.
Instead, when the Gumeys did not pay the prejudgment interest by April 14, 2004,
Iron Head, as directed by the trial court, prepared and submitted a final judgment, which
was entered on August 11, 2006. (R. 441-42.) The entry of this Judgment, which
closely tracked the above-emphasized language of the April 14, 2004 Order, completed

3

the final step in resolving all the claims of all the parties. The Judgment was never stayed
and the Gurneys, therefore, properly appealed from this Judgment.3
Iron Head now insists, however, that the Gurney's filing of a Motion to Compel
Release of Lien and Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens on June 26, 2006 prevented
the Judgment from being final. Iron Head apparently believes that by filing this Motion,
the Gurneys somehow presented, for Iron Head, the issue of whether Iron Head's lien
could validly serve as security for the prejudgment-interest obligation. However, as
indicated, under the April 14, 2004 Order, Iron Head needed to present this issue via its
own motion.
By filing their Motion, the Gurneys merely sought to remove Iron Head's lien
from their property, which was wrongfully left in place after it was resolved by the
settlement agreement. These proceedings address collection methods, a winding-up step,
unrelated to the issue on appeal of whether Iron Head was entitled to prejudgment interest
in the first place. See Matter of Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) ("'[W]hether an order is deemed a 'final order' is not necessarily dependent in all
instances upon whether all issues in a lawsuit have been adjudicated. The test to be
applied is a pragmatic test.'" (quoting First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel
& Assocs.f 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979)). In describing the pragmatic test, the
Morrison Court stated "failure to allow an appeal" from certain orders "that resolve

3

The Gurneys note that Iron Head is wholly at fault in creating this jurisdiction
issue. If the Iron Head did not intend the Judgment to be the final order on the
prejudgment-interest issue, why then did Iron Head submit prepare and submit it to the
trial court for entry?
4

issues of vital importance" and "conclude a major phase of the process" could "compel
all subsequent proceedings . . . to go forward under a cloud of uncertainty." Id. In First
of Denver, following this test, the Supreme Court considered an order final even though
various cross and counter claims, unrelated to the issue on appeal, were unresolved:
In the instant case no further judicial action remains to be
taken with respect to the issues of priority and the sale of the
property; and, but for the appeal, sale of the property and
disbursement of the proceeds would occur. To require the
appeal to abide the determination of pending unrelated claims
would make an appeal on the issue of priorities moot. Unless
an appeal may be taken at this point, substantial property
interests may be destroyed since the sheriffs sale would
proceed and the money would be disbursed on the basis of the
priorities determined by the trial court. With the issuance of a
sheriffs deed and the disbursement of monies, the legal rights
and obligations of the parties are finally established.
Accordingly, under a pragmatic view of the test of finality,
the order appealed in this case is final.
First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 528-29.
In the present case, the prejudgment-interest issue is even more clearly final than
those issues considered final in Morrison and First of Denver. All of the claims of all of
the parties have been resolved, and all the steps required under the April 14, 2006 Order
have been taken with Iron Head's filing of the Judgment on August 11, 2006. Because
Iron Head did not file a motion establishing that its lien could validly serve as security for
the prejudgment interest obligation prior to submitting the Judgment for entry by the
Court, the prejudgment interest issue is final, notwithstanding the fact that the Gurneys
sought release of and penalties for Iron Head's wrongfully unremoved lien. Simply put,
the continued validity of Iron Head's lien in any capacity is not relevant to the issue on

5

appeal. Moreover, if Iron Head was not entitled to prejudgment interest, then the validity
of its lien as security for that obligation is moot.
II.

THE GURNEYS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO APPEAL IRON HEAD'S ENTITLEMENT TO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Iron Head next claims that the Gurneys' appeal is procedurally deficient because

the Gurneys failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision.
However, the marshaling burden is not imposed in all instances, but is limited to
situations where an appellant is challenging a finding of fact as either clearly erroneous or
an abuse of discretion. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding
must first marshal are record evidence . . . ." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Parduhn v.
Bennett, 2005 UT 22,^25, 112 P.3d 495. Consequently, marshaling is not required when
the appellant challenges only a trial court's pure legal conclusions. See, e.g., Peirce v.
Peirce, 2000 UT 7,1(17 n. 4, 994 P.2d 193 ("[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to
challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law.").
As Iron Head acknowledges {see Appellee Brief, p. 14), "[a] trial court's decision
to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which [is] review[ed] for
correctness." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,Tfl6, 82 P.3d 1064. Nevertheless,
Iron Head argues that the Gurneys have a marshaling burden because the determination
of whether to award prejudgment interest is a mixed question of law and fact, citing
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt
Lake Brewing Co., LLC, 2004 UT App 227, 95 P.3d 1171. However, neither of these
cases support this assertion. Davies does not set forth a standard of review and Carlson
6

confirms that the decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest is a question of law. See
Carlson, 2004 UT App 227 at %\5. Notably, Iron Head does not set forth a single
authority imposing the marshaling burden in an appeal on the issue of whether a party
was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.4
The Gurneys assert that the trial court erred in making any award of prejudgment
interest to Iron Head, as the award was based upon a compromise sum, arrived at through
the litigants' agreement to settle all claims between them, including equitable claims,
prior to and in lieu of the rendering of judgment on the underlying causes of action by the
trial court. This is not a fact-sensitive issue, but a purely legal one having equal
application in any case regardless of the actual facts at issue in that case. Thus, the
Gurneys' challenge the trial court's legal conclusion that Iron Head was entitled to
prejudgment interest in the first place.5

Iron Head's marshaling argument may admit more than it intends: Iron Head
argues that a "trial court cannot reach that decision [to award prejudgment interest]
without first making certain factual determinations." (Appellee's Br., pp. 14-15.) The
trial court made no factual findings here; it merely attempted to impose an interest
obligation on an amount it acknowledged was a compromise sum. (R. 392.) The trial
court's Order, according to Iron Head's standard, is thus deficient. Moreover, where no
factual determination was made, there can be no marshaling requirement.
5

Although the Gurneys argue that the trial court erred, in part, by randomly
choosing December 31, 2000 as the date from which interest is to run (see Appellants'
Brief, p. 4-5), they do not make this argument to claim that the interest awarded should
be something less than $12,835.48. Instead, the Gurneys assert that the trial court's
choice of a random date shows the award was based on discretion, which is error because
Utah courts require the "loss" be "fixed as of a particular time," and an absence of
discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 20, 82 P.3d 1064.

7

However, even assuming arguendo that the Gurneys were required to marshal the
evidence, which they were not, they have amply fulfilled their burden. Specifically, the
Gurneys set forth, in Fact Paragraphs 14 through 19 of their initial brief, everything the
trial court relied on in awarding prejudgment interest to Iron Head. The Gurneys further
cited to the pleadings filed by Iron Head. Iron Head claims, however, that the Gurneys
did not marshal the evidence because they did not cite all the evidence adduced at trial
and did not order a transcript of the trial.6
This argument itself reveals an inherent flaw in Iron Head's position that it is
entitled to prejudgment interest. The trial was never completed and, as indicated in the
April 14, 2004 Order of the Court, was settled while Iron Head's first witness was still
testifying, "without completing Iron Head's case and without the presentation of any
evidence by the Gurneys." (R. 392-93.) Accordingly, the trial court's award of
prejudgment interest could not properly be based on the incomplete evidence presented at
the trial; this evidence was inconsistent as presented by Iron Head's witness and would
have been further contradicted by the Gurneys if given a chance. To the extent the trial

The Gurneys cited an Affidavit of Patrick Kilbourne to describe the conflicting
and inconsistent evidence submitted by Iron Head and demonstrating that it would be
impossible to determine the actual amount of money owed to Iron Head (if any) without
completing the trial. {See Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-14.) Although Iron Head now
objects to the use of this affidavit (on grounds of hearsay and foundation), it did not raise
any objection below and the Kilboume Affidavit is part of the appellate record. Iron
Head may not challenge the sufficiency of this affidavit for the first time on appeal. State
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("It is a well-established rule that a [litigant]
who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the
first time on appeal.")

8

court has relied on such evidence, it was not only clearly erroneous, but fundamentally
unfair and incorrect as a matter of law.
III.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS NOT PROPERLY AWARDED
BECAUSE THE CASE WAS SETTLED AND THUS THERE WAS NO
FINDING OF LIABILITY OR DAMAGES AWARDED.
Iron Head's arguments regarding the merits of the prejudgment interest award are

similarly without merit. Each of Iron Head's arguments as to why the award should be
affirmed suffers from a single fundamental problem. Namely, an award of prejudgment
interest requires, as its basis, a finding of liability and an award of damages against the
party to pay interest.

Here, as the Gurneys explained in their initial brief, there was no

finding of liability, no finding of loss, and no damages were awarded.8
Instead the case was settled by all parties on the third day of trial, after it became
apparent that the trial could not be finished in the allotted time and would have to be
continued months later, for the compromise sum of $43,500. This number is not
"calculable within a mathematical certainty" or the product of the precise "facts and
figures" necessary for an award of prejudgment interest. See Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT
1

See, e.g., Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^ 20, 82 P.3d 1064 ("The true
test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before judgment in a given
case or not is .. . whether the injury and consequent damages are complete and must
be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence . . . . "
(emphasis added)); Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, \ 43, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16
(observing "'[prejudgment interest is properly awarded when the damage is complete
. . . and if damages are calculable within a mathematical certainty.'" (emphasis added)
(quoting Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt, 2005 UT App 430, \ 35, 124 P.3d 269)).
8

This fact resolves Iron Head's argument that prejudgment interest is justified as an
award of consequential damages. By settling the case with the Gurneys, Iron Head gave
up any right to pursue an award of damages, compensatory or otherwise.

9

App 19, T| 43, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. Likewise, this amount is not traceable to any
amount allegedly owed or claimed to be owed by the Gurneys to Iron Head.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to save its prejudgment interest award, Iron Head
claims that in settling the case it "essentially waived its claim for lost profits" and, thus,
the $43,500 settlement amount reflects its damages minus lost profits.9 (Appellee's
Brief, p. 13 n .3.) Notably, Iron Head does not provide a single record cite or other
evidence (such as an invoice or contract) supporting this assertion. Indeed, this is
because it is not accurate. In its complaint, Iron Head sought $71,000 plus profit and
interest. It previously filed a mechanic's lien on the properly in the inconsistent amount
of $119,051. (R. 1-8.) Its invoices yielded different totals yet, and all of these figures are
at variance with Iron Head's contract. (R. 15-16.) If this is the case, how can the $43,500
settlement amount equal Iron Head's damages minus lost profits?
Moreover, the statement of facts in Iron Head's brief do not support its assertion.
In Paragraph 12, Iron Head claims that it was required to borrow $61,800 to pay its
subcontractors and for the costs of materials.10 (Appellee's Brief, p. 6.) In Paragraph 13,
Iron Head claims it had incurred interest on the loan of $13,048.32 as of the second day
of trial. (Id.) However, the trial court did not base its award of prejudgment interest on
9

The statement made in footnote 3 of Iron Head's brief on appeal to the effect that
the parties agreed to settle all claims for payment of Iron Head's actual costs is absolutely
false. The number was arrived at purely as a compromise figure with no substantiation of
invoices or records.
10

The Gurneys note that this and other record cites set forth in Iron Head's
Statement of Facts are not to the record evidence, but rather to Iron Head's own
characterizations of that evidence in Iron Head's Brief in Support of Claim for
Prejudgment Interest, filed with the trial court on December 5, 2003. (R. 323-36.)
10

the bank debt, interest allegedly paid by Iron Head, or any other specified amount or
factor.
The fact of the matter is that Iron Head's attempts to reconstruct the facts and
figures to justify the prejudgment-interest award simply do not work. Contrary to Iron
Head's assertions, the $43,500 settlement amount was the product only of the settling
parties' discretion and was not owed, sought or liquidated prior to the date the settlement
agreement was entered into. This amount was agreed upon by Iron Head and the
Gumeys as a means to end the litigation, with everyone compromising. The authorities
agree that it is improper to award prejudgment interest on a stipulated and thus,
discretionary, sum. See Smith, 2003 UT 41 at ^[20 (stating prejudgment interest may not
be based on discretion); Carlson Distribution Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. 4 2004
UT App 227,fflf32-34, 95 P.3d 1171 (refusing to base an award of prejudgment interest
on a stipulated amount of damages, but instead requiring the interest to be based on the
amount of damages actually awarded by the jury); Pearson Construction Co. v.
Intertherm Inc.t 566 P.2d 575, 576 (Wash Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to award prejudgment
interest on a stipulation because this would chill settlements).
Importantly, despite the fact that the Gurneys raised this exact issue in their initial
brief, Iron Head has cited no authority even purporting to allow prejudgment interest on a
settlement amount accruing from a date prior to the execution of the settlement
agreement. Iron Head does, however, cite to this Court's decision in Davies v. Olson
granting prejudgment interest from "the date defendant Lund signed the settlement
statement... as that was the date the benefit was conferred." 746 P.2d at 270. Iron Head
11

takes this statement completely out of context. The "settlement statement" discussed in
Davies was not an agreement to settle the litigation, but was rather a document prepared
to assist in the closing of the real estate transaction at issue. See id. at 266. This real
estate transaction document had nothing to do with the compromise of a dispute.
Furthermore, unlike the present case, in Davies prejudgment interest was awarded after
trial was completed, following a finding of liability and an award of damages. Id.
TV.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY NOT BE AWARDED ON AN
EQUITABLE CLAIM.
Iron Head also argues that prejudgment interest is properly awarded on quantum

meruit and unjust enrichment claims. As the Gurneys explained in their initial brief, this
is contrary to current Utah law. See generally Bellon v. Malnary 808 P.2d 1089, 1097
(Utah 1991); Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). Although Iron Head relies on the Davies Court's award of prejudgment
interest in a quantum meruit case, this decision is also contrary to later Utah law and, as
explained above, specifically distinguishable by the fact that prejudgment interest was
awarded following a complete trial, including a finding of liability and an award of
damages. Davies, 746 P.2d at 266. Iron Head, here, settled all of its equitable claims along
with its legal claims without distinguishing among them. This, along with the fact that
there was no finding of liability or damages awarded, is fatal to Iron Head's case. See
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355,1f24, 993 P.2d 222 (upholding the
trial court's denial of prejudgment interest since one of the five causes of action the
plaintiff submitted to the jury was an unjust enrichment claim).

12

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the Gurneys' initial brief, the
prejudgment interest award must be reversed.
Dated this 11th day of June 2007.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

EDWIN C. BARNES
AARON D. LEBENTA
LLOYD D. RICKENBACH
Attorneys for Appellants
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Attorney for Appellee
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MARVIN D BAGLEY (Bar No. 4529)
Attorney for Plaintiff
669 North Main
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Telephone No. (435) 896-9090
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKI W. GURNEY,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 010600008

JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

This court having issued an Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest on December 16,
2003, ordering that plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. was entitled to judgment against Alan
K. Gurney and Vicki W. Gurney for prejudgment interest in the amount of $12,835.48 calculated
as of November 12, 2003, and defendants having failed to pay plaintiff that amount on or before
April 14,2004, in accordance with this court's Order dated April 13, 2004, and good cause
appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Iron Head Construction, Inc. against defendants
Alan K. Gurnery and Vicki W. Gurney jointly and severally in the amount of $12,835.48
together with post judgment interest at the rate of 3.41% from November 12,2003, until paid.
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Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
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One Utah Center
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201 South Main Street
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Lloyd D. Rickenbach
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
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day of
, 2006,1 caused to be mailed by U.S. Mail, first
class postage thereon prepaid a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the
following:
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center
Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
Lloyd D. Rickenbach
PO Box 440008
Koosharem, UT 84744
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Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217)
Walter A. Romney, Jr. (Bar No. 7975)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
Facsimile: (801) 521-6280

CLERK

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

:
:
:
:

Civil No. 010600008
Judge David L. Mower

-vsALAN K. GURNEY and
VICKI W. GURNEY,
Defendants.

Trial commenced in this case on November 10, 2003 before the Honorable
David L. Mower. Plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. was represented by its counsel
of record, Marvin D. Bagley, and two of its representatives, Richard Curtis and Amber
Curtis, were present during the proceedings. Defendants Alan K. Gurney and Vicki W.
Gurney appeared in person and were represented by their counsel of record, Edwin C.
Barnes.
On the third day of trial, November 13, 2003, Iron Head's first witness was still
testifying and it was apparent to all that the trial could not be completed within the time

allotted. At that time, without completing Iron Head's case and without presentation of
any evidence by the Gurneys, the parties agreed on terms to compromise all of Iron
Head's claims, with the exception of its claim for prejudgment interest. The parties
orally presented their settlement agreement to the Court. In their oral presentation, the
parties agreed to submit the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest to the Court for
decision by simultaneous written arguments and submissions. The parties did so and,
on or about December 16, 2003, the Court issued its Order On Motion for Prejudgment
Interest, awarding $12,835.48 to Iron Head based upon application of mathematical
principles to the agreed settlement amount.

- ^

f&to^

The parties represent in filing this Order that the agreed settlement amount was
timely paid. Iron Head's claims, having been thus resolved, are hereby dismissed with
prejudice with the exception of the prejudgment interest claim.
The prejudgment interest payment, in accordance with the Court's ruling and the
schedule agreed to by the parties, will be due on or before April 14, 2004. Should the
Gurneys make timely payment of the prejudgment interest amount, the Gurneys may
submit a form of final Judgment pursuant to which all claims between Iron Head and the
Gurneys will be completely released and discharged. In the event the Gurneys do not
pay the prejudgment interest amount on or before April 14, 2004, Iron Head may submit
a form of final Judgment ordering payment in the amount of $12,835.48 on the basis of
the Court's December 15, 2003 Order. Iron Head may also, by motion and affidavit(s),

*

^w

present the issue of the validity of Iron Head's claimed lien to the Court for a
determination as to whether the lien is security for that obligation.
Dated this

^

of April 2004.
BY THE COURT:
/
^

DAVID L. MOWER
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

'jL^v
JRVIND.BAGLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010600008 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

lq day of

NAME
MARVIN D. BAGLEY
ATTORNEY PLA
180 NORTH 100 EAST
SUITE F
RICHFIELD, UT 84701
EDWIN C BARNES
ATTORNEY DEF
201 S MAIN ST 13TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84111-2216

Qfikll

20 0</.

Deputy Court Clerk
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